WITHIN EACH LAWYER’S CONSCIENCE A TOUCHSTONE: LAW,
MORALITY, AND ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
ROBERT M. PALUMBOS

†

Lawyers, like all citizens, inevitably face conflicts between their responsibility to the law and their moral obligations. Attorneys, however,
have a unique range of options for resolving such conflicts. They not
only have power and privilege in the legal system that other citizens
lack, but they also assume a heightened duty to that system and to the
law. As the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states, “[t]o law1
yers especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.”
Civil disobedience has become an accepted method for citizens to
2
resist the authority of the state on moral grounds. By committing
3
civil disobedience and willingly accepting judicial punishment, one
can protest the moral content of a law while still respecting the legal
duty it imposes. This Comment addresses whether the current rules
of professional ethics leave the option of civil disobedience available
to attorneys, and asks under what circumstances attorneys may be justified in exercising that option.
†

B.A. 1999, The Johns Hopkins University; M.A. 1999, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. for offering his thoughts as I shaped this Comment. I am also
grateful to Steve Bero, Melanie McMenamin, and Indraneel Sur for their extraordinarily helpful thoughts on a draft of this Comment.
1
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1980).
2
See In re Eastburn, 914 P.2d 1028, 1029 (N.M. 1996) (per curiam) (“Civil disobedience, militant protest, inflammatory rhetoric, and other forms of resistance to established authority have had an important role in the history of democracy.”); Lindsey
Cowen, The Lawyer’s Role in Civil Disobedience, 47 N.C. L. REV. 587, 587 (1969) (“[I]t appears that most persons who have written on the subject believe that under certain circumstances conduct that is illegal, and therefore punishable by the state, may nevertheless be morally justified.”); Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective,
27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1996) (noting that the author, a law professor, supported civil disobedience against the Vietnam War and himself committed civil disobedience); William H. Pryor, Jr., Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 8
(2003) (implying that the author, the sitting Attorney General of Alabama, believed civil
disobedience was justified under certain circumstances to protest unjust laws).
3
I will use “civil disobedience,” “conscientious noncompliance,” and other related
terms interchangeably to refer to “the violation of law by nonviolent means where opposition to the law is based on a deeply held conviction that the law itself is in conflict
with some higher principle.” Robert B. McKay, Civil Disobedience: A New Credo?, 2 GA.
L. REV. 16, 19 (1967).
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Attorney civil disobedience is hardly novel. The man who famously demonstrated the power of civil disobedience to the world,
Mohandas Gandhi, was trained in the English common law system and
4
practiced law for more than twenty years. Far from being an obstacle
to moral reform, Gandhi’s legal training was instrumental in the development of nonviolent resistance to British imperial control of India. Gandhi maintained a very lawyerly respect for the law and the le5
gal system even as he defied it. This Comment explores the extent to
which the American bar has accepted Gandhi’s example of reform for
its own lawyers.
After reviewing the moral and philosophical justifications for civil
6
disobedience in Part I, I will examine the codes of professional ethics
and related case law in Part II to determine the position of the organized
bar on attorney civil disobedience. This discussion makes clear that, despite the bar’s insistence in its official rules that its members obey and
respect the law, there is a measure of unofficial tolerance for conscientious noncompliance by lawyers. Unfortunately, it remains uncertain
from the application of the ethics rules how far this tolerance goes.
Part III addresses normative arguments for and against permitting
lawyers to engage in civil disobedience in light of the legal profession’s relationship to law and society. I argue that the main criticisms
of attorney civil disobedience overlook key elements of the bar’s relationship to the law, to the public, and to the legal system. While lawyers should be cognizant of a heightened responsibility to obey the
law, the theoretical and practical arguments in favor of allowing them
to commit civil disobedience, under some circumstances, are stronger
than those in opposition.
4

John Leubsdorf, Gandhi’s Legal Ethics, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 923, 923 (1999).
See id. at 938-39 (describing the respect with which Gandhi submitted himself to
the law’s judgment as an important part of his philosophy).
6
Unless otherwise specified, I will use the terms “codes of ethics” or “ethics
rules” to refer collectively to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), promulgated by
the American Bar Association and now binding in most states. See ABA COMPENDIUM
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 637 (2004) [hereinafter ABA
COMPENDIUM] (listing the forty-five jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules).
Though the Model Rules superceded the Model Code in 1983, I will consider both the
Model Code and the Model Rules in this Comment. The Model Code remains relevant because “many provisions of the Model Rules are based on provisions of the
Code.” NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7
(1998). In addition, prior court decisions based on the Model Code still hold true under the Model Rules. Id. Thus, discussing the approach of the Model Code towards
attorney civil disobedience provides a broader and more accurate view of the bar’s attitude on this issue.
5
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Finally, in Part IV, I will elaborate on the circumstances in which
attorney disobedience is justified. I propose to amend the rules of legal ethics to acknowledge explicitly that attorneys should subject the
law to some personal moral scrutiny. By recognizing that moral obligations may overcome legal duties, the canons of legal ethics will
strengthen an important safeguard against injustice. However, since it
is appropriate that attorneys exercise a greater degree of caution than
other citizens before committing civil disobedience, the rules should
establish clear consequences for justified noncompliance. Currently,
attorneys face a high-stakes gamble as to how the bar’s disciplinary
bodies will respond to their disobedience. Leaving their careers to
the whims of the profession’s disciplinary discretion makes the cost of
attorney civil disobedience too high. Yet, imposing some professional
consequences on attorneys is appropriate because it will make them
evaluate more rigorously the principle for which they are willing to
break the law and consider the social costs of their disobedience.
I. THE PURPOSES OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The concept of justified civil disobedience has deep roots in our
jurisprudence and has survived challenges to its philosophical founda7
tions. Traditional natural law theory, which has influenced Western
8
legal tradition for centuries, posits a necessary connection between
9
law and morality. Best illustrated by St. Augustine’s proposition that
10
“an unjust law is no law at all,” natural law theory claims that a law
7

See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (“Civil disobedience has a long heritage in this country, beginning as far back
as the Boston Tea Party.”).
8
See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 12-14 (rev. ed. 1990) (describing the development
of natural law theory by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as its
reformulation by the thinkers of the Enlightenment and the French and American
Revolutions).
9
See id. at 11 (“Natural law theories maintain that there is an essential (conceptual, logical, necessary) connection between law and morality. . . . [A]ccording to natural law theory, it is part of the very meaning of ‘law’ that it passes a moral test.”); see also
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 184 (2001) (describing the natural law proposition that “law
must be essentially connected with morality”).
10
AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8 (Thomas Williams trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1993) (ca. 395). This quote has been called a “slogan” of natural law, see
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 11, and was used by Martin Luther King, Jr., to
justify his own civil disobedience, see MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham
Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76, 82 (1964), available at http://www.stanford.edu/
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11

lacking moral legitimacy is not legally valid. Legal positivism, which
12
grew out of the Enlightenment in reaction to natural law theory, sev13
ered the essential link between law and morality. Whereas natural
law theory understands legal validity as a normative category, positivism treats it as a purely descriptive one. Positivists look to a law’s
14
pedigree—not its moral content—to determine its legal legitimacy.
Valid laws are those issued by the sovereign in accordance with the
15
“rule of recognition” of the legal system. They impose an obligation
on citizens to obey, and they become a standard within the society for
16
criticizing and justifying behavior.
It was against the background of the debate between natural law
and positivism that Henry David Thoreau, the “father” of modern-day
17
civil disobedience, developed his understanding of one’s right to
break the law. Thoreau accepted the positivist perspective that morally repugnant laws were still legally binding, but claimed that his
group/King/popular_requests/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf (last visited Dec. 31,
2004).
11
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 9, at 187 (characterizing the natural law perspective that laws “can be normative in the way they claim only if they are consistent
with moral norms”).
12
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 19. Enlightenment figures such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant shifted jurisprudential inquiry away from natural law
theory and laid the groundwork for John Austin’s system of positivism. See THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651)
(“[E]very subject in a Common-wealth . . . hath covenanted to obey the Civill [sic]
Law”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 55 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) (arguing that one can inquire into what is legal without inquiring into what is moral).
13
See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 9, at 188 (describing the positivist position as one that recognizes the sovereign’s rules as law even if those rules are “terribly
immoral”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185-86 (2d ed. 1994) (defining positivism as “the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality”).
14
See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 22 (noting Austin’s argument that under positivism “the legal is distinguished from the nonlegal in terms of pedigree,” not
morality).
15
See HART, supra note 13, at 100 (“Wherever such a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and officials are provided with authoritative criteria for
identifying primary rules of obligation.”); cf. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 6-11 (Robert Campbell ed., Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1875)
(arguing that laws are commands by the sovereign backed by threat of force, not moral
authority).
16
See HART, supra note 13, at 55-56 (noting that a law, unlike a custom or habit,
becomes a measure for criticizing behavior and a justification for demanding certain
actions).
17
Cowen, supra note 2, at 588 n.6; Kenneth Jost, Opinion, Oliver North and the Son
of Sam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1991, at 18.
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moral obligations could nevertheless outweigh his duty to obey the
18
law. Arguing that even a just government authorized by “the sanction
and consent of the governed” had “no pure right over [his] person
19
and property,” Thoreau chose to withhold his taxes and accept imprisonment rather than fund the government’s support for slavery
20
and its engagement in the Mexican War. Thus was born the modern
concept of civil disobedience, under which “[p]ersons are thought to
be justified in violating the law if, but only if, they are prepared to be
21
punished for their disobedience.”
Positivism remains, by and large, the dominant American ap22
proach toward legal ethics today. Nevertheless, the history of the
twentieth century strongly impressed upon Western culture the tragic
potential of obeying laws merely because they are legally valid. We
fear what William Simon described as the “nightmarish slippery slope
of Positivism” that “leads to compliance with jurisdictionally adequate
but morally evil laws like the Nazi enactments requiring reporting Jews
23
and dissidents or the antebellum Fugitive Slave Laws.” We have seen

18

See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 231 (Owen
Thomas ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1966) (1849) (declaring that it is better to break the
law than to be the “agent of injustice” through one’s obedience).
19
Id. at 243.
20
See id. at 228 (discussing the need to “do justice to the slave and to Mexico”); see
also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (“Some, like Thoreau, chose to refrain from society’s fundamental obligation to
pay taxes for the common benefit in order to express their repugnance to a government that fostered slavery.”).
21
HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 274-75 (1999); see also KING, supra note 10, at
83-84 (“I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust,
and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect
for law.”); Pryor, supra note 2, at 8 (contrasting civil disobedience, in which the individual accepts punishment, with lawbreaking in which an individual seeks to evade
punishment).
22
Cf. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS 37 (1998) (“Legal ethics is the only area in which [practicing lawyers] continue
to cling to [the positivist approach].”) Few would seriously argue the traditional natural law position that an unjust law lacks legal validity. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra
note 8, at 7, 11-12 (criticizing natural law theory for insisting that “no rule can count as
law unless what it requires is at least morally permissible” and thus failing to realize the
obvious fact that “law and morality are in some sense different even if closely related”);
David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 793,
801 (1991) (noting that “natural law theories are quite out of favor with contemporary
lawyers”).
23
William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 224
(1996); see also Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in
Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 916-17 (1995) (recounting the argument that “the
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the reality of legal regimes that were so unjust that noncompliance
with them became, to some, a moral obligation superceding the legal
24
duty to obey the law. Modern advocates of positivism have recognized the need for some moral inquiry into a citizen’s duty to the law,
noting that “the certification of something as legally valid is not con25
clusive of the question of obedience.” Consequently, though mainstream American society rejects classical natural law theory, it also re26
sists a categorical duty to obey valid laws and recognizes civil
disobedience as a valid form of protest and a valid democratic check
27
on unjust laws.
Though the right of citizens to engage in civil disobedience is
widely accepted, it remains highly contested whether attorneys have
28
(or should have) the same right. This is clearly a significant question
for our society generally and for lawyers in particular. Attorneys enjoy
unique privilege and power within the judicial system; their rights,
status, and actions inherently affect our legal environment in ways that
those of other citizens do not. Our willingness as a society—and the
bar’s willingness as a profession—to tolerate attorney noncompliance

actions of the German legal community under the Nazis resulted from the modern
positivist attempt to maintain the distinction between legal and moral validity”).
24
See KING, supra note 10, at 84 (justifying the violation of unjust laws in Nazi
Germany and communist countries); Stephen Ellmann, To Live Outside the Law You
Must Be Honest: Bram Fischer and the Meaning of Integrity, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
767, 768-70 (2001) (describing lawbreaking by judicial actors within the South African
apartheid system).
25
See HART, supra note 13, at 210 (“[Men] should preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience,
and that . . . its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.”).
26
Id.; Simon, supra note 23, at 228 (“Mainstream American legal culture incorporates both Positivist and Substantive perspectives, giving emphasis to one or the other
in some areas, while trying awkwardly to synthesize them in others.”); Strassberg, supra
note 23, at 905 (stating Ronald Dworkin’s position that “recognizing the inherent legitimacy of much civil disobedience is fundamental to overcoming the separation between law and morality”).
27
See supra note 2.
28
Compare David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 259 (1996) (“[B]ecause lawyers are often better positioned
than nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law, lawyers often
should be among the first to violate or nullify it, or to counsel others that it is acceptable to violate or nullify it.”), and Simon, supra note 23, at 218 (arguing that the dominant view on legal ethics is skewed far too heavily in the positivist direction, restricting
a lawyer’s ability to facilitate a moral outcome), with Timothy P. Terrell, Toward DutyBased Lawyering?: Rethinking the Dangers of Lawyer Civil Disobedience in the Current Era of
Regulation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 831, 834-35 (2003) (claiming that lawyer civil disobedience
should be discouraged because it necessarily undermines the legal system’s claim to
legitimacy).
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illuminate the American attorney’s relationship to the law in several
ways.
First, the acceptability of civil disobedience by lawyers necessarily reflects a judgment about the interests that attorneys represent.
Our position on this issue reveals whether we view lawyers purely as
agents mediating the respective interests of their clients and the
state, or whether we also consider them accountable to society for
broader moral interests. Second, since one justification for civil
disobedience is that there is a personal right to violate the law out
29
of moral obligation, forbidding attorney noncompliance strips
lawyers of a prerogative that has come to be understood as a basic
element of citizenship. It is prudent to recognize explicitly whether
this sacrifice is one of the collateral effects of the decision to be an
attorney.
Third, since lawyers are among the primary actors implementing
the state’s edicts, their capacity to disobey unjust or evil laws is particularly relevant to our concern about the slippery slope of positiv30
ism. Given the powerful role of attorneys in the legal system—both
practical and symbolic—their acts of noncompliance will almost certainly have a greater impact (for good and bad) than those of other
citizens. Finally, the issue of lawyer civil disobedience potentially restricts the type of laws that can be justifiably disobeyed. Since there
are some legal obligations imposed only on attorneys by virtue of
31
32
their profession, these rules may only be disobeyed by attorneys.
A determination that lawyer disobedience is prohibited would mean
that these laws are not considered susceptible to noncompliance, a
proposition that contradicts our society’s general acceptance of the
concept of civil disobedience.

29

Cf. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910 (D. Mass. 1969) (“When the
state through its laws seeks to override reasonable moral commitments it makes a dangerously uncharacteristic choice.”); THOREAU, supra note 18, at 243 (“[T]o be strictly
just, [government] must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have
no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it.”).
30
See Strassberg, supra note 23, at 916 (noting that “judges and lawyers obeyed and
enforced [the] ‘valid’ laws” of Nazi Germany).
31
See, e.g., PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1 (2001) (establishing legally binding
rules of professional responsibility for attorneys admitted to the Pennsylvania bar).
32
See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 9.20 (3d ed. Supp. 2003) (noting that under the original Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) (amended in 2002, see infra note 57), a lawyer would have had to violate the
requirement of client confidentiality in order to save a life, and suggesting that an attorney in this situation would be justified in engaging in civil disobedience).
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II. THE TREATMENT OF ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE UNDER
THE CODES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Lawyer civil disobedience differs from that of other citizens because attorneys are subject to binding professional rules of ethics to
33
which they alone must answer. This fact allows for attorney civil disobedience in two possible forms: (1) violations of substantive law, and
34
(2) violations of binding professional ethics requirements. With respect to the former, attorneys, like all other citizens, are subject to
criminal liability. Unlike other citizens, however, attorneys also face
potential punishment under their codes of ethics for such lawbreak35
ing. The latter form of civil disobedience is available only to lawyers
and punishable under professional disciplinary rules, not the criminal
36
law. This discussion will not distinguish between the two forms of
lawyer disobedience because the operative question is the same for
both types: what are the consequences to an attorney under the codes
of professional ethics for conscientiously violating legally binding
37
rules?
33

See Strassberg, supra note 23, at 904 (“In all fifty states, lawyers are governed and
will continued [sic] to be governed by positive rules.”).
34
See Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, A
Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1611, 1628-29 (1996) (describing violation of ethics rules for moral reasons as civil disobedience).
35
See infra text accompanying notes 39-46 (describing the characterization of lawbreaking by attorneys as misconduct under professional norms).
36
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (stating that the “bounds of the
law” include enforceable professional regulations in addition to substantive law); see also
supra note 32 (describing an attorney’s breach of client confidentiality as potential civil
disobedience).
37
There is a significant body of literature that discusses the professional ethics
problems an attorney faces while representing clients contemplating civil disobedience,
including: Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); Luban, supra note 22, at 793-98;
Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U.
PITT. L. REV. 723 (1991); Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH.
L. REV. 287 (1994); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in
the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995). Such representation
could theoretically constitute attorney disobedience to the ethical codes, which prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting a client “in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (“[A] lawyer shall not . . . [c]ounsel or assist his
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal . . . .”). These representational
issues, however, are largely beyond the scope of this Comment. Though they might be
characterized as questions about attorney disobedience to the rule of law, these issues
involve very thorny problems of client autonomy, role morality, and the attorney’s
gatekeeper function in the legal system. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
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The codes of ethics present a striking obstacle to answering this
question. The ethics rules impose seemingly conflicting duties on
38
lawyers with respect to civil disobedience. On the one hand, the
codes state in no uncertain terms that lawyers have a “duty to uphold
39
40
legal process” and to show respect for the law by obeying it. Both
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) explicitly
define professional misconduct to include illegal actions. The Model
Code states that a “lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude” or “any other conduct that adversely reflects
41
on his fitness to practice law.” The Code warns against “even minor
42
violations of law by a lawyer,” and holds attorneys responsible for the
law at all times, regardless of whether they are acting in their profes43
sional or personal capacities. The Model Rules establish that it is

AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-66 (1988) (discussing the dominant principle of nonaccountability of attorneys for the decisions of their clients). Such issues are related to, but
distinct from, the question of whether attorneys may violate the law for moral reasons
outside of their representational roles; these deserve separate attention.
Moreover, while important unresolved questions remain about representing clients
considering conscientious lawbreaking, there appears already to be greater agreement
in the legal community about the propriety of such representation than there is about
actual attorney disobedience. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 6
(“[T]he fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent
does not of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action.”); Newman, supra, at 29092 (arguing that the professional codes of ethics clearly allow an attorney to give neutral
legal advice to a client that will likely be used to commit a crime); Press Release, National Lawyers Guild, National Lawyers Guild Supports Acts of Civil Disobedience in
Protesting Preemptive Strike Against Iraq (Oct. 3, 2002) (announcing intent to provide
legal support and materials to individuals and groups considering civil disobedience),
available at http://www.nlg.org/news/statements/iraq_cd.htm (last visited Dec. 31,
2004).
38
See Judith A. McMorrow, Civil Disobedience and the Lawyer’s Obligation to the Law,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139, 139-41 (1991) (discussing how a lawyer’s “special obligations both to uphold the law and to strive to make the law just” make it unclear
whether attorneys may commit civil disobedience).
39
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 5.
40
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (“Obedience to law exemplifies respect for the law. To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than
a platitude.”); ABA Young Lawyers Div., Lawyer’s Pledge of Professionalism, in ABA
COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 437 (“I will encourage respect for the law and our legal
system through my words and actions.”).
41
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A); see also id. EC 1-5 (declaring that attorneys should “refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct”).
42
See id. EC 1-5 (“[E]ven minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen
public confidence in the legal profession.”).
43
See id. (stating that a lawyer’s duty to demonstrate respect for the law and the
legal profession is due to “his position in society” as an attorney); McMorrow, supra
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“professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
44
a lawyer.” Thus, compared to the Model Code, the Model Rules narrow the scope and degree of illegal conduct for which attorneys are
45
responsible. Nevertheless, a pattern of minor violations remains sufficient to discipline an attorney under the Model Rules, including the
46
use of temporary or permanent disbarment.
Taken by itself, such language would prohibit attorney civil disobedience fairly clearly. The ethics rules, however, also impose on
lawyers a duty to improve the law by seeking to make it more just. The
Model Code advises attorneys to “[a]ssist in [i]mproving the [l]egal
47
[s]ystem” and to strive to make the law more “just, understandable,
48
and responsive to the needs of society.” The Model Rules similarly
49
emphasize that lawyers should improve the law and the legal system.
Thus, the professional rules of ethics place on lawyers two sets of
responsibilities that intersect and conflict on the question of conscientious lawbreaking. Civil disobedience is one potential mechanism by

note 38, at 152 (noting that, under the Model Code, the ABA rejected “any distinction
between professional and personal conduct, stating that a lawyer must comply with applicable rules at all times”); see also In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980) (rejecting
attorney’s contention that he should not be disciplined for illegal conduct because it
“was unrelated to his professional skill and ability to practice law”).
44
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
45
See id. R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (“Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.”); William H. Simon, Moral
Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 424 n.13 (2001) (describing the Model Rules as taking “a more moderate line” on violations of the law by
attorneys than the Model Code).
46
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (“A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”); Strassberg, supra note 23, at 902 n.14 (criticizing David
Luban’s proposal for giving attorneys who commit justified civil disobedience “no comfort that their careers will or should survive”); Terrell, supra note 28, at 835-36 (noting
that attorney civil disobedience risks the punishment of disbarment).
47
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8.
48
Id. EC 8-2; see also id. EC 8-9 (“The advancement of our legal system is of vital
importance in maintaining the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes and improvements.”).
49
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 6 (“[A] lawyer should
seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice
and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.”); id. Preamble para. 7 (“A
lawyer should strive . . . to improve the law and the legal profession . . . .”); id. R.
6.1(b)(3) (emphasizing that lawyers should participate “in activities for improving the
law, the legal system or the legal profession”).
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which lawyers might seek to make the law—or the rules governing the
50
legal profession—more just. Yet, the rules appear to forbid such
well-intended lawbreaking.
One possible solution to this conflict, identified in the Model Code,
is simply to limit an attorney’s efforts to improve the law to “lawful
51
means.” This resolution is deficient in three respects. First, the Model
52
Rules lack a similar restriction. Second, the Model Code’s limitation
on attorney disobedience is in tension with its claim that “[e]ach lawyer
must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to
53
test the extent to which his actions” are ethical. Likewise, the Model
Rules note that a lawyer’s professional duties must be informed by
“personal conscience,” not merely the obligations imposed by the
54
black letter words of the codes of ethics. The spirit of such advice
surely opens the door, however slightly, to attorney civil disobedience.
Finally, attorneys may face circumstances in which lawful efforts to
improve the law or prevent injustice are either ineffective or impossi55
ble.
Consider, for example, a case in which a client tells her lawyer that
she committed the crime for which another person is about to be exe56
cuted. Until 2002, if a client refused to waive confidentiality, the law-

50

See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 32, § 9.20 (suggesting that if a lawyer violated a
professional ethics rule on moral grounds, “[t]he publicity arising from such a case
might well lead to salutary changes in the law—a hallmark of conscientious civil disobedience”); Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1998) (arguing that civil disobedience is one option for
criticizing an unjust law and that “the legal profession needs criticism to improve its
own standards”).
51
Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (stating that a lawyer “should
endeavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law”).
52
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1(b)(3) (stating that a lawyer should
“provide any additional services through . . . participation in activities for improving
the law, the legal system or the legal profession” (emphasis added)); id. R. 6.1 cmt. 8
(providing a nonexhaustive list of examples of how a lawyer may work to improve the
law); cf. supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that the Model Rules adopt a
more moderate approach to illegal lawyer conduct).
53
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble.
54
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 7 (“Many of a lawyer’s
professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as
well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience and the approbation of professional peers.”).
55
See Minow, supra note 37, at 727-39 (describing the limits on lawful reform, the
potential negative consequences in pursuing it, and the advantages that civil disobedience offers in certain situations).
56
See Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating
Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1631, 1632,
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yer would have been prohibited by the Model Rules from taking steps
57
to prevent the execution. In essence, the lawyer had no “lawful” op58
tions at her disposal to ensure a just result. In such instances, disobeying the law may be the most ethical course of action because it is
the only way to prevent the legal system from committing a grave injustice. The “lawful reform” limitation fails to take such situations into
account.
The case law offers little help in resolving this conflict or in clarifying what the consequences of conscientious noncompliance are under
the codes of ethics. There are few instances on record in which practicing attorneys have committed civil disobedience and been subject
59
to disciplinary proceedings. Professor Monroe Freedman provides a
personal account of what is perhaps the prototypical example of attorney civil disobedience. Freedman writes that he “openly violated
the rules against advertising and solicitation, intentionally courting
disciplinary action, because [he] believed that those rules deprived
poor and unsophisticated people of essential information about
60
their rights.” The District of Columbia Bar Association brought disciplinary charges against Professor Freedman, but eventually agreed
with his position and issued “the first opinion anywhere approving ad61
vertising and solicitation of clients.” He notes that “[w]hen asked by

1636-37 (1996) (arguing that client confidentiality should be violated in the face of the
loss of an innocent life). Perhaps the best known example of a life-or-death professional ethics problem occurred in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn.
1962). Attorneys for a defendant in a personal injury suit involving a car accident discovered that the plaintiff had a potentially fatal aneurysm which may or may not have
been caused by the accident. Id. at 707. It was clear that the plaintiff was unaware of
the condition. Id. at 708. The defense attorneys completed settlement negotiations
and never informed the plaintiff of the aneurysm, out of respect for their client’s interests in the case. Id.
57
In 2002, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules was amended to permit breaches of client
confidentiality in order “to prevent reasonably certain death.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1). The change in this Rule illustrates that the law governing attorneys, like other positive law, can and should evolve to accommodate overriding moral principles.
58
I assume that, in this situation, an attorney’s “noisy withdrawal” would not have
been helpful to the innocent defendant. See id. R. 1.16 cmt. 7 (noting that an attorney,
in such situations, might be permitted to withdraw representation).
59
See Daly, supra note 34, at 1628 (noting that the author had “located no instances of civil disobedience directed to the judicial branch in its capacity as the regulator of the legal profession”); Griffin, supra note 50, at 1260 n.17 (admitting that the
author did “not know how often civil disobedience ha[d] been invoked in disciplinary
settings”).
60
Freedman, supra note 2, at 1137.
61
Id. Professor Freedman also writes that he engaged in civil disobedience several
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reporters and others how I, as a lawyer, could commit civil disobedience, I answered, ‘I was a free person, with moral responsibility, be62
fore I was a lawyer.’”
Some lawyers have raised a civil disobedience defense to lawbreak63
ing that courts found lacking in moral justification. Though such
defenses were unsuccessful, the willingness of courts and disciplinary
boards to consider them suggests that there may indeed be a role for
conscientious disobedience in professional ethics cases. One state bar
committee stated that “a single act of civil disobedience did not call
into question an attorney’s fitness to practice law,” but that “frequent
and/or continual misdemeanor convictions of this nature may result
64
in more serious professional consequences.”
The treatment of applicants for admission to the bar provides a
fair—though imperfect—comparison of how the rules of ethics are
65
The certification
interpreted with regard to civil disobedience.
process is analogous to disciplinary proceedings in that state bars require applicants, like their members, to be of good moral charac66
ter. Criminal conduct in both contexts reflects on an attorney’s
67
moral fitness because it shows a lack of respect for the law. The retimes to protest the Vietnam War, but does not mention whether disciplinary action
resulted from these acts. Id. at 1138.
62
Id. at 1138.
63
See In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1980) (noting that the Disciplinary Board
of the Alaska Bar Association concluded that an attorney’s distribution of drugs was
not an act of civil disobedience intended to change the law); In re Disciplinary Action
Against Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1997) (rejecting attorney’s claim that
his failure to pay court fees was an act of civil disobedience and holding that “it is not
the system that is in need of reexamination and reform,” but rather the defendant).
64
McMorrow, supra note 38, at 154 (citing Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1185,
VA. LAW. REGISTER, Oct. 1989, at 14).
65
The comparison between the certification process and disciplinary proceedings
is limited by the fact that certification is based on more stringent requirements than
disciplinary review. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential,
94 YALE L.J. 491, 547 (1985) (describing the “double standard” between the admission
and disciplinary processes that results because “both substantive and procedural requirements are more solicitous of practitioners than applicants”). Consequently, illegal conduct is more likely to be flagged during an admissions inquiry as a sign of moral
deficiency than in the context of disciplinary action against a practicing attorney.
66
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (recognizing the
importance of allowing state bars to select their own members, but adding that these
members should be of good character); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 12 (stating that applicants to the bar who are deficient in moral standards are not qualified); Rhode, supra note 65, at 546 (“[T]he justification for regulating the personal
behavior of licensed attorneys is in many respects analogous to that underlying the certification process.”).
67
See Rhode, supra note 65, at 537 (noting that applicants are often rejected from
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sponse of bar committees to applicants with civil disobedience in
their background varies widely. Some states see politically or morally
motivated lawbreaking as deeply problematic for bar admission,
68
while others see it as almost admirable. The California Supreme
Court, for example, held that an applicant’s multiple arrests in the
context of the civil rights movement did not disqualify him from the
practice of law, noting that such noncompliance might be consid69
ered a product of “the highest moral courage.” By contrast, Illinois
denied admission to a conscientious objector to World War II on the
grounds that his pacifist views prevented him from complying with a
state constitutional requirement that applicants serve in the state’s
70
militia during time of war. Thus, while the treatment of bar applicants suggests that there is some tolerance of civil disobedience
among the bars, the states differ too widely in this respect to draw
any clear lessons.
Part of the difficulty in determining the consequences of civil disobedience under the rules of ethics is simply that the codes themselves, like nearly every other form of positive law, are subject to many
71
reasonable interpretations. To prohibit illegal conduct that involves
72
“moral turpitude” or “reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
73
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer” invites the disciplinary boards
to inject subjective values, including their own sense of morality, into
bar admission due to illegal activities, “regardless of the likelihood of their repetition
in a lawyer-client relationship,” because they “would demean the profession’s reputation”). The primary difference between disciplinary procedures and bar admission
inquiries is that in the former, the bar bears the burden of showing the attorney’s
moral deficiency, while in the latter, applicants bear the burden of showing their own
moral fitness. See Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 421 P.2d 76, 80 (Cal. 1966)
(stating that applicants to the bar bear the burden of showing moral fitness, while the
bar bears the burden of proving attorneys are unfit during disciplinary hearings);
Rhode, supra note 65, at 547 (same).
68
See Rhode, supra note 65, at 542-43 (describing the variety of reactions to an applicant’s arrest in connection with political activity among the bars of Arkansas, California, Idaho, Missouri, New York, Nevada, and Virginia).
69
Hallinan, 421 P.2d at 87.
70
See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 571-73 (1945) (affirming the Illinois Supreme
Court’s rejection of the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s beloved Professor
Clyde Summers from the bar).
71
See Strassberg, supra note 23, at 901 (arguing that the “modern articulation of
legal ethics as positive law” might “seriously undermine the justification” for engaging
in civil disobedience).
72
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3); see also id. EC 1-5 (declaring that attorneys should “refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct”).
73
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b).

2005]

WITHIN EACH LAWYER’S CONSCIENCE

1071

their review. It should hardly be surprising, then, that the record of
applying the rules provides few definitive answers.
The secondary literature also does little to narrow the range of interpretations of the Model Rules and Model Code. Some commentators argue that the ethics codes obviously prohibit any conscientious
74
disobedience. Others seem to suggest that one can fairly understand
75
an attorney’s professional obligation to permit civil disobedience.
Most acknowledge that the various rules contain ambiguities that al76
low for considerable “interpretive leeway” on the issue.
Without clear indications of the consequences of conscientious
lawyer noncompliance in the codes of ethics, the case law, or the secondary literature, the most honest—and realistic—resolution to the
issue is that the disciplinary prosecutors who enforce the rules currently retain enormous discretion as to how to treat civil disobedi77
ence. Though perhaps intellectually unsatisfactory, this conclusion
should hardly be surprising. We accept the propriety of prosecutorial

74

See, e.g., Luban, supra note 22, at 796 (claiming that under the Model Rules, “a
lawyer who engages in conscientious disobedience to law is no better than a street
criminal, and indeed may be worse if her conscientious disobedience arises from an
ideology that is hostile to the American legal system”); Simon, supra note 45, at 424
(noting that there is “no tolerance . . . for civil disobedience” in the rules of professional ethics).
75
See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 2, at 597 (noting that a lawyer could theoretically
“stand on the same footing as the nonlawyer” in committing civil disobedience).
76
Terrell, supra note 28, at 831; see also McMorrow, supra note 38, at 151 (“Both
[the Model Rules and Model Code] contain broad ambiguities.”).
77
See Strassberg, supra note 23, at 905 (“The actual application of ethical rules
suggests a far less rigid construction than might be assumed. Bar associations and state
disciplinary institutions . . . do not necessarily display the rigid adherence to the limited reach of a rule or specified exceptions which a formalist approach to the rules
would dictate.”). But cf. Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance,
Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307, 1311 (1998)
(“[T]he extent of disciplinary prosecutors’ discretion may be especially limited because they lack the independence of criminal prosecutors.”).
Some commentators have noted that the benefits of prosecutorial discretion may
be far greater in cases involving attorneys in large firms. See, e.g., Steven France, Can
the Bar Regulate the Large Firms?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at 28 (noting that the wide
discretion in disciplining prominent attorneys raises serious questions about whether
the bar is willing or able to regulate attorneys at large firms, or whether its disciplinary
power is directed only at “the occasional stray solo practitioner who pockets money
from a client’s escrow account”); Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?, FORBES,
Aug. 12, 2002, at 58, 58 (noting that the bar’s disciplinary authorities “would be absurdly outgunned” when attempting to discipline attorneys at large firms). This raises
important questions about the bar’s disciplinary process that are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
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discretion in the criminal justice system as a check on unfair laws. It
is certainly possible that the dearth of case law in this area is influenced by prosecutors turning a blind eye to conscientious disobedience. And as Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes have
noted, bar authorities undoubtedly approach attorney civil disobedi79
ence with sensitivity to the moral context of the lawbreaking. In a
self-regulated profession in which moral judgment and political inde80
pendence are prized, we should expect—and respect—such sensitivity.
Of course, it would be discomforting to any attorney contemplating civil disobedience that her professional fate is left to the discretion
of a prosecutor with a moral compass potentially different from her
own. Attorneys committing civil disobedience currently risk discipli81
nary actions that include temporary or permanent disbarment. It is
clear from this discussion that there is some tolerance, though perhaps
82
only unspoken, of the role of civil disobedience by attorneys. This
may be cold comfort, however, given the stakes at play for lawyers.
III. REFUTING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Critics of attorney civil disobedience note that there is far more at
stake when lawyers break the law than simply the consequences for an
attorney’s career. They argue that noncompliance by the bar has potentially much broader costs to the legal profession, to society, and to
the law itself. In their minds, attorney civil disobedience is inappropriate in a legal system that is “generally just, even though not per-

78

See, e.g., Simon, supra note 23, at 226 (“Prosecutorial nullification is widely considered legitimate in circumstances where the application of a statute produces an especially harsh or anomalous result or where an entire statute, usually an old one,
seems out of tune with contemporary sentiment . . . .”).
79
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 32, § 9.20 (arguing that it is unlikely that bar
authorities would discipline an attorney for violating the rules of ethics to save a life).
80
See supra text accompanying notes 53-54 (highlighting the ethics rules’ emphasis
on an attorney’s personal conscience); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S.
252, 273 (1957) (“It is also important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be
unintimidated—free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar.”).
81
See supra note 46 and accompanying text; cf. Luban, supra note 28, at 259 (arguing that the Model Code and Model Rules should be amended to permit lawyers to
commit civil disobedience without jeopardizing their licenses).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 63-69 (discussing the various ways in which
the bar has recognized there may be some tolerance of conscientious disobedience by
attorneys).
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83

fect.” Thus, regardless of whether attorneys can commit civil disobedience under the ethics rules, it remains contested whether they
should.
In this section, I will respond to the four major arguments against
civil disobedience by analyzing the relationships among the legal profession, the law, and the public. When these relationships are properly understood, it becomes clear that none of these institutions would
be threatened by an ethics regime that explicitly tolerated attorney
civil disobedience.
A. Attorney Civil Disobedience and Respect
for the “Rule of Law”
The first major objection to attorney disobedience is that it sig84
nificantly weakens the law’s normative power.
Because the law’s
authority depends in large part on the willingness of individuals in our
society to accept and obey it, erosion of respect for the “rule of law” is
85
a serious threat to our legal system. Critics of attorney disobedience
86
claim that attorney attitudes toward the law “rub off” on nonlawyers.
Citizens take cues from attorneys when developing their own sense of
obligation to respect the law. Attorneys who disobey the law—even
conscientiously—convey to the lay public the potentially dangerous
message that the law should be ignored when an individual deems it
appropriate to do so.
Related to this claim is the concern that attorney disobedience has
a second, more direct effect on the authority of our legal system.
While it is deeply problematic for the average citizen not to feel particularly obligated to follow the law, it would be disastrous if the bar
87
had the same lax attitude. Attorneys are judicial actors whose role is

83

Terrell, supra note 28, at 834.
See id. at 835 (“[D]isobedience to the legal and ethical rules of the [legal] system necessarily undermines the system’s claim to legitimacy.” (emphasis omitted)).
85
See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 29 (stating that a stable legal order requires that the majority of citizens must view the laws “as standards of criticism and justification”).
86
See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a
Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 292 (1996) (“[T]he attitudes that lawyers convey about the law are likely to rub off on their clients, thereby
multiplying the effects of lawyer noncompliance. Even nonclients are likely to pick up
important messages about the appropriate moral standing of law from the conduct of
lawyers.” (footnote omitted)).
87
See HART, supra note 13, at 116-17 (arguing that judicial actors must accept the
internal perspective of the legal system in which they operate); MURPHY & COLEMAN,
84
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to implement and interpret the laws. A legal system in which lawyers
felt no particular commitment to the rule of law would be ineffective
at enforcing social norms and likely unstable. Increasing tolerance for
attorney civil disobedience might lead individual attorneys to become
overly emboldened to make their own judgments about which laws
88
deserve respect and which ones do not. This could greatly undermine the consistency and effectiveness of the legal system.
In short, critics charge that attorney lawbreaking “is likely to have
89
larger negative consequences than similar actions” by nonlawyers.
Civil disobedience may be acceptable for citizens, but legal ethics
should not lightly tolerate lawyer noncompliance because it significantly undermines our society’s respect for the legal system and the
rule of law. Such arguments appear to mirror the reasoning of the
provisions in the Model Rules and Model Code, which emphasize that
90
“respect for the law should be more than a platitude” for attorneys.
Attorneys have a special relationship to the law that gives them a special responsibility to obey it.
Such claims certainly have some merit. One can vividly imagine
the injustice of a legal system in which lawyers routinely violate the law
themselves. Moreover, the actions of attorneys undoubtedly affect the
attitude of others towards the law. Nevertheless, there are several
counterarguments to this position—both theoretical and practical—
that significantly undermine its criticism of attorney civil
disobedience.
1. Civil Disobedience Demonstrates
Respect for the Law
The first response to the claim that lawyer noncompliance weakens respect for the law is based on the very nature of civil disobedience. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, “an individual who breaks [a] law that conscience tells him is
unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in
91
reality expressing the highest respect for the law.” By submitting
supra note 8, at 29 (noting the importance of judicial actors respecting the normative
power of the law).
88
Cf. Luban, supra note 22, at 809 (arguing that lawyers may commit civil disobedience because they are “obligated to respect the law only when the law deserves respect”).
89
Wilkins, supra note 86, at 292.
90
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5.
91
KING, supra note 10, at 83-84.
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oneself voluntarily to the legal system’s judgment, one recognizes and
affirms the law’s authority and the legal obligations it imposes, even
92
while protesting its morality. This aspect of civil disobedience does
not change simply because it is a lawyer who commits it.
Civil disobedience puts a choice to the authority figures it challenges: punish the lawbreaker and affirm the value of the rule; disassociate from the system because it is unjust; or acknowledge mistake in
93
the rule and change it. Far from weakening the law’s authority, civil
disobedience affords the state an opportunity to strengthen its normative power. In response to conscientious lawbreaking, the legal system
reevaluates the rule that was violated, struggles with the moral issues it
implicates, and strengthens the legal obligation imposed by affirming
the law and punishing the lawbreaker. It is true that a judicial pronouncement radically out of line with a society’s common morality
may undermine the public’s sense that the law in question is just and
deserving of respect, but this is in no way exacerbated by the fact that
the lawbreaker is an attorney.

92

See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 938-39 (describing the respect with which Gandhi submitted himself to the law’s judgment as an important part of his philosophy).
In contrast, David Luban has argued for what I believe is a more radical view of civil
disobedience. He claims that citizens and lawyers are “obligated to respect the law
only when the law deserves respect.” Luban, supra note 22, at 809. “When the law is
evil, unfair, or hopelessly stupid . . . the obligation [to obey it] vanishes and disobedience is in order.” LUBAN, supra note 37, at 35. While such rhetoric is similar to that of
traditional civil disobedience, it differs significantly by opening the door to the claim
that immoral laws impose no legal obligation on citizens. Luban’s position all but collapses the distinction between moral and legal obligation. See Luban, supra note 22, at
809 (suggesting that the “ground of [legal] obligation lies in some morally relevant
property of laws”).
This approach is much closer to the traditional natural law perspective—i.e., that
an unjust law is not a valid law—than it is to my operative conception of civil disobedience, under which one recognizes a valid legal obligation that is simply trumped by a
competing moral duty. See id. at 801-02 (arguing that the law implies a “utopian ideal”
and acknowledging the similarity between his position and natural law); id. at 806 (stating that lawyers should consider the “natural-law legality” of a contested law when considering whether to take a case). The understanding of civil disobedience I have in
mind here, however, is decidedly not based on natural law. By willingly accepting punishment from the legal system, a conscientious objector recognizes a law’s legal validity
and separates her moral obligations from her legal ones. Such a separation has a
strong positivist flavor to it, in spite of the moral protest involved. See HART, supra note
13, at 210 (arguing that morally iniquitous laws may still be valid, but that the legal obligations they impose can be overcome by nonlegal, moral inquiry).
93
See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1137 (explaining how the author’s civil disobedience forced the bar to change an ethics rule); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 932 (recounting Gandhi’s statement that a judge must either inflict punishment on the lawbreaker or disassociate from the “evil” law at issue).
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An example of the opportunity conscientious lawbreaking offers
to strengthen legal obligation is provided by the case of Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore, who defied a federal injunction
that ordered him to remove a monument of the Ten Commandments
94
he had placed at the courthouse. While there are unique aspects of
Moore’s case that distinguish it from the typical conscientious disobe95
dience, the matter is fairly comparable to attorney civil disobedience
for the purposes of evaluating its effect on public respect for the law.
In both cases, the defiance is public, based on a moral objection to
the law, and committed by a judicial actor.
Chief Justice Moore’s defiance provided the federal and state judiciaries with the opportunity to strengthen the rule of law. The federal judiciary affirmed the importance of the First Amendment’s protection of separation of church and state, and the Alabama state
judiciary reinforced the principle that “[n]o man in this country is so
96
high that he is above the law.” Regardless of one’s moral views about
Moore’s actions, the incident left no doubt as to his legal obligations
under the First Amendment. As one might expect in a pluralistic society, Moore had strong supporters whose respect for the law and
97
sense of duty to it was shaken by the incident. But for other citizens,
94

See Pryor, supra note 2, at 1 (“On August 14, 2003, Chief Justice Roy Moore announced that he would not obey an injunction of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to remove a monument with a depiction of the Ten Commandments from the rotunda of the State Judicial Building.” (footnote omitted)); see
also Stan Bailey, Moore Kicked Off State’s High Court: ‘No Man . . . Is So High as to Be Above
the Law,’ Court Rules, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 14, 2003, at A1 (describing the consequences of Justice Moore’s defiance of the federal injunction).
95
For starters, there is a genuine question as to whether or not Chief Justice
Moore’s defiance actually qualifies as justified civil disobedience. See Pryor, supra
note 2, at 2 n.7 (noting that Moore himself was equivocal about whether his actions
constituted justified civil disobedience); Anthony J. Sebok, Ten Commandments Defiance
Doesn’t Meet Civil Disobedience Test, CNN.COM, Aug. 26, 2003 (arguing that Moore’s defiance was not justified civil disobedience), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/LAW/08/26/findlaw.analysis.sebok.commandments. In addition, Moore’s position as a judge distinguishes his disobedience from that of a private citizen. See Pryor,
supra note 2, at 8 (observing that Moore’s moral position was different from Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s in part because Moore was a public official); Sebok, supra (arguing
that Moore had a “special obligation to obey the law and to obey duly adjudicated interpretations of the law” because he was a judge).
96
In re Moore, No. 33, slip op. at 9 (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary Nov. 13, 2003) (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)), available at http://
www.judicial.state.al.us/documents/final.pdf, aff’d, Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n,
No. 1030398, 2004 WL 922668 (Ala. Apr. 30, 2004).
97
See Pryor, supra note 2, at 2 (referring to Moore’s supporters); Bailey, supra note
94 (describing the support Moore received even after his punishment by the Alabama
Court of the Judiciary).
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particularly those who take their cues about the law’s validity and worthiness from the judicial system itself, the lesson of Moore’s defiance
was that he violated a fundamental principle of our society and that
the judicial system responded by disciplining him accordingly. The
law functioned fairly and efficiently, dealing with Moore as it would
have another lawbreaker without his considerable official stature.
Surely this was a victory for the rule of law, not a defeat.
2. The Double Standard for Judging Attorney Civil Disobedience
and Routine Legal Practices
There is something particularly hollow about the claim that attorney civil disobedience weakens respect for the law in light of many
common practices that we expect and encourage in the name of
98
“zealous representation.” As a matter of course in their daily work,
lawyers seek to utilize the law to the advantage of their clients, often at
the expense of the public good, a law’s clear purpose, or the interest
99
100
of justice. Attorneys exploit loopholes in the tax code, structure
101
transactions to avoid pesky regulations, and argue for far-fetched
102
After the colconstructions of the law to further client interests.
lapse of Enron, the public learned that it was “routine” (though per98

See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (“A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law”).
99
See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988)
(noting that lawyers “are expected and even encouraged to exploit every loophole in
the rules, take advantage of every one of their opponents’ tactical mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or factual interpretation to favor their clients”); Stephen
F. Smith, Cultural Change and “Catholic Lawyers,” 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 31, 48 (2003)
(“‘[J]ustice’ to the contemporary lawyer is whatever his client wants to achieve and
nothing more.” (emphasis omitted)); Mike France, Commentary, Close the Lawyer Loophole, BUS. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 70, 70 (characterizing attorney advice on risky tax shelters as a “get-out-of-jail-free card” for clients).
100
See George Cooper ed., The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1555-60 (1980) (recounting a debate
about the ethics of aggressive representation and “tax avoidance”); David B. Wilkins,
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 520-21 (1990) (describing the practice
of tax attorneys giving clients advice that furthers client interests, regardless of whether
the advice is contrary to the public purpose of the tax code).
101
See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 9, 17-24 (2002) (describing the role of attorneys in structuring the transactions that later forced Enron into bankruptcy); see also Koniak, supra note 77, at 58
(“[W]ithout lawyers few scandals would exist, and fewer still would last long enough to
cause any real harm.”).
102
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (permitting attorneys to argue in favor of any construction of the law, without regard “to the likelihood that the
construction will ultimately prevail”).
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haps not legal) for lawyers to give advice that would have the effect of
103
frustrating federal investigations. A century ago, future Justice Louis
Brandeis noted that it increasingly seemed to be the project of attorneys to “evade or nullify the extremely crude laws by which legislators
104
sought to regulate the power or curb the excesses of corporations.”
The messages sent by the legal profession through such representation are clear: a client’s interest supercedes the public interest; the
law is vulnerable to seemingly endless manipulation; even the clearest
105
of legal duties is subject to debate.
The effect of such messages,
conveyed to the public by nearly every aspect of the modern legal profession, is unquestionably significant to our society’s attitude towards
the law. Lawyers who stretch the fabric of the law to its breaking point
while representing clients seek to reshape the applicability of a legal
duty to fit their client’s interests, which may overlap with the public
106
good—but only coincidentally. Such representation strips the law of
its veneer of generality, the characteristic that is most critical to our
107
society’s internal sense of obligation to the law. Such a pervasive attitude in the legal profession must weaken our society’s respect for the
rule of law at least as much as it is purportedly weakened by attorney
civil disobedience, by which lawyers demonstrate their devotion to the
103

See Rhode & Paton, supra note 101, at 24 (describing the profession’s reaction
to the actions of Nancy Temple, the in-house Arthur Andersen attorney whose advice
during the Enron affair eventually helped lead to the firm’s downfall).
104
Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address to the Harvard Ethical
Society (May 4, 1905), in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 52, 57 (Philippa Strum ed., 1995).
105
These attitudes are central to an attorney’s education during law school. As
one commentator noted of his own law school experience:
Legal writing was . . . the assembly of new, partisan structures from the various
components discovered in the process of deconstructing relevant cases. It
didn’t matter, apparently, that these new structures were routinely built of
blocks intended for entirely different purposes, that ill-fitting components
were mangled or left out, that the completed structure often served the lawyer’s purposes as much as his client’s. The point was to create a building that
looked better than one’s opponents’ . . . even if it was just a house of cards.
CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE
LAW SCHOOL 95 (1991); see also Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a
Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity
in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 501 (2003) (“Law school teaches students to
become tough-minded, hyper-rational, and insensitive to issues beyond the interests of
their client—a perspective that undermines ethical decision-making.”).
106
See Pepper, supra note 37, at 1554 (arguing that the legal profession’s approach
to the law “may lead the client to respect the law less”).
107
See LUBAN, supra note 37, at 48-49 (“[T]he principle of partisanship in the legal
profession threatens to undermine the generality of law and thus to abrogate the
moral authority of law. It is only its generality, its fairness, that elevates law from a coercive system to a system exerting moral—and not just physical—force.”).
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public interest and affirm the legal authority of the law by willingly accepting punishment.
Critics of lawyer civil disobedience seem to apply two sets of
rules to attorney actions that affect respect for the law. They fear
the effect of morally motivated noncompliance by attorneys, but defend a model of the profession that sacrifices respect for the generality of law to a client’s interests. This apparent inconsistency is not
merely a product of applying different standards to attorney actions
taken while representing a client than to actions taken in one’s in108
dividual capacity. For example, in the context of criticizing attorney disobedience, Professor Timothy Terrell also condemns the development of a “duty-based” practice of law, which emphasizes
109
Terrell cites several
society’s interests over those of one’s clients.
examples of the trend toward duty-based lawyering that he finds
particularly troubling, including recent strategies to hold attorneys
accountable for their role in questionable transactions within the
healthcare industry, as well as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirement
110
that attorneys breach confidentiality to prevent securities fraud.
Whatever one thinks about the merit of these attempted reforms of
the legal profession, it is clear that they were intended to rehabilitate our society’s respect for and trust in the law after instances in
111
which attorneys’ advocacy for their clients seemed to go too far.
Thus, Terrell’s criticism of these changes, juxtaposed with his fear
112
that attorney civil disobedience will weaken respect for the law, is
perplexing.
I should not be misunderstood as taking a position directly on the
question of whether it is proper for attorneys to engage in so-called
“aggressive lawyering” in their clients’ interests. There are strong arguments that keeping the interests of clients at the center of attorney
advocacy helps the law to evolve and improve for the benefit of society. It is a model that protects a client’s autonomy and provides a
113
check on the power of the state. My critique is limited to noting the
108

See Terrell, supra note 28, at 847 (defining attorney civil disobedience to include violations of ethics rules committed to protect a client’s interests).
109
See id. (stating that a duty-based practice of law would fundamentally change
the legal profession).
110
See id. at 848-51 (listing examples of duty-based lawyering).
111
See id. at 850 (finding that the Sarbanes-Oxley provision was enacted to
strengthen investor confidence and trust in the securities laws).
112
See supra note 84.
113
See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 116, 176-81 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, supra note 37) (arguing that Luban’s
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inconsistency of those who claim that attorney civil disobedience is
flawed because it weakens respect for the law while simultaneously defending routine practices of lawyers that likely have a more adverse effect on the rule of law. Civil disobedience and aggressive lawyering
implicate the same interests: improvement of the law and resistance
to the state’s potential for injustice. These goals either outweigh the
need for attorneys to protect the public’s respect for the law, or they
do not. If they do, however, they should do so in both contexts.
3. The Inconsistent Position of the Organized Bar
on Attorney Civil Disobedience
Past actions by the organized bar cast doubt on how seriously one
should take its insistence in the Model Rules and Model Code that at114
torneys display an almost sacred respect for the law. When it comes
to the law governing lawyers, the bar has demonstrated far less respect
for the law than one might assume based on its pronouncements in
the codes of ethics. According to Professor Susan Koniak, the bar has
“flouted and bypassed court attempts to articulate the law governing
lawyers . . . [and] used its own power to insist on a law that diverges
115
In so doing, the
from the ‘official’ law articulated by the courts.”
bar has suggested that respect for the state’s law appropriately takes a
back seat to other considerations in certain instances.
At various times in recent history, the bar has asserted its claim to
116
self-regulation when threatened with increased government oversight.
On occasions when the government has regulated lawyers over the objections of the legal profession, the bar has directly resisted the new
rules. When state courts began to require attorneys to violate traditional rules of client confidentiality to prevent fraud, the ABA—rather
than accept and respect the determination of the judiciary—insisted
117
The bar’s resisthat the profession was under no such obligation.

proposal to restrict the partisanship of lawyers when such partisanship violates common morality would severely interfere with client autonomy).
114
See supra text accompanying notes 39-46 (describing the strong emphasis in the
Model Rules and Model Code that attorneys demonstrate respect for the law).
115
Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their
Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (1993).
116
See Koniak, supra note 77, at 58 (“Twice in its history [the SEC] had gotten serious about regulating the bar. Both times the bar beat the agency back.”); Koniak,
supra note 115, at 1091 (describing the reaction of the bar to the government’s prosecution, in the early 1990s, of the law firm Kaye Scholer for its participation in the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal).
117
See Koniak, supra note 115, at 1094-96 (describing the bar’s extensive struggle
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tance included an acknowledgement that “lawyers may (and perhaps
even should) refuse to comply with lower court orders requiring disclosure of information that the lawyer believes to be confidential, even
in circumstances in which the clear weight of legal authority mandates
118
In 1989, when the IRS requested attorneys to report
disclosure.”
cash payments in excess of $10,000, “[t]he vast majority of lawyers re119
ceiving the IRS demand letter refused to comply.” No cry issued in
response from the organized bar about the importance of respecting
the rule of law; far from it. In fact, bar leaders encouraged attorneys
120
to continue their resistance.
In other words, notwithstanding the lofty rhetoric in the Model
Code and Model Rules that “[t]o lawyers . . . respect for the law
121
should be more than a platitude,” the bar has supported attorney
civil disobedience. Certainly this cannot, and should not, be taken
as a general endorsement of noncompliance by the ABA. It should,
however, give us some perspective about the consequences of lawyer
disobedience on our society. In real-world applications of the ethics rules, even the organized bar has recognized that there are some
extralegal principles that outweigh an attorney’s legal duty and her
professional responsibility to demonstrate respect for the law.
While it is conceivable that the bar views the rule of client confidentiality as the only principle for which it is worth an attorney breaking the law, it is more reasonable to believe that there are competing moral precepts of greater worth for which civil disobedience is
122
also justified.

with state courts over the issue of disclosure of confidential information).
118
Wilkins, supra note 86, at 276-77; see also Koniak, supra note 115, at 1102 (“Ethics opinions advising lawyers what to do when faced with state law that appears to require disclosure or some other infidelity to the client suggest that a lawyer is free to
ignore the weight of court authority.”).
119
Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1405 (1992).
120
See id. at 1406-07 (describing the reactions of leaders of the state and national
bar associations to the attorney noncompliance); Wilkins, supra note 86, at 277 (“[B]ar
leaders continue to urge lawyers to defy an IRS regulation requiring lawyers to report
cash payments by clients above a certain amount.”).
121
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5.
122
See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 32, § 9.20 (arguing that a lawyer would be justified in violating client confidentiality in order to save a life).
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4. Isolated Acts of Attorney Civil Disobedience
Do Not Threaten the Rule of Law
A final common-sense response to the claim that attorney civil
disobedience will erode respect for the law is that any adverse impact on the rule of law from a lawyer’s isolated act of noncompli123
ance will be minor. Any negative impact on the public would very
likely remain localized for the simple reason that it would be rare
124
Moreover, atfor the disobedience to be publicized more widely.
torney civil disobedience is almost certain to remain relatively isolated. While nearly every lawyer recognizes flaws in the legal system,
few lawyers question the law’s legitimacy so deeply that they would
125
resort to noncompliance on more than a rare occasion. Evidence
indicates that many attorneys hold views similar to those of their
privileged clients—hardly the citizens from whom one expects wide126
One survey reported that only about
spread civil disobedience.
one in every six attorneys in large firms had ever refused an assignment or potential work solely because it violated her personal val127
Such empirical evidence about the attitudes of attorneys
ues.
strongly suggests that a codified ethical acknowledgement that some
moral obligations may trump an attorney’s duty to respect the law
will not open the floodgates to widespread attorney civil disobedience.

123

See Wilkins, supra note 100, at 511 (“An isolated act of lawyer nullification does
not threaten the rule of law.”).
124
See Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. REV.
191, 212 n.85 (2001) (“Although lawyer ‘misconduct’ often is publicized in the press,
the lawyer’s notoriety typically is limited to the local jurisdiction. The systemic effects
of the lawyer’s conduct will probably be similarly confined.”). There are, of course,
exceptions to the general thesis that attorney civil disobedience receives only local attention. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussing the case of Alabama
Chief Justice Roy Moore).
125
See Kathryn Abrams, Lawyers and Social Change Lawbreaking: Confronting a Plural
Bar, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 778 (1991) (noting that many lawyers do not “question
the legitimacy of the legal system,” and that even those who do so do not widely resort
to civil disobedience).
126
See Wilkins, supra note 100, at 513 (“Empirical evidence indicates that many
lawyers—particularly those representing the powerful—hold views about legal merit
that strikingly resemble the interests of their clients.”). But see Abrams, supra note 125,
at 761-66 (arguing that attorneys who represent oppressed or powerless clients are less
likely to view the legal system as wholly legitimate).
127
Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 534-35 (1985).
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B. Attorney Civil Disobedience and Respect for Lawyers
The second major argument commonly offered against attorney
civil disobedience is that it reduces the public’s respect for the legal
profession. Given that our society generally assumes all citizens have a
duty to follow the law, attorney civil disobedience may reflect negatively on lawyers generally. The public may trust lawyers less, for fear
that they have their own agenda and that their professional ethics are
128
inadequate.
Nonlawyers may perceive attorney noncompliance to
be symptomatic of a double standard in the legal profession, whereby
lawyers, while ostensibly counseling others to obey the law, feel at liberty to disobey it themselves.
Reducing the public’s trust in the legal profession has worrisome
implications for client service, as well as for the legal system as a
whole. Lawyers enjoy power and privileges that are contingent on
maintaining the public’s trust in the profession. A lawyer’s ability to
conceal information under attorney-client confidentiality that other
citizens would be required to disclose is just one example of such a
privilege. For the profession to continue justifying such special
treatment, society must believe that attorneys are people of integ129
In addition, as trust of lawyers erodes, the legal system berity.
comes more unstable. Clients must depend on attorneys to honor
130
their duty of zealous representation; judges must rely on lawyers to
act as upright “officers of the court” who will play fair while serving
their clients. The judicial process depends on the trust that all sides
place in attorneys to uphold their duties. Thus, the charge that lawyer civil disobedience weakens respect for the legal profession is a serious concern.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that our society hardly
seems to hold lawyers in high esteem today. A brief survey of the

128

See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 211-13 (describing the potential impact of attorney defiance on the public’s perception of the legal profession).
129
See France, supra note 99, at 70 (relating the character requirements for attorneys to their extensive power in the legal system). In addition, Professor Timothy
Terrell has argued that “[i]f and only if the rule of law has a normative foundation
does the ‘role’ a lawyer plays as a professional have any moral standing.” Terrell, supra
note 28, at 834. Thus, by undermining the public’s sense of duty to obey the law
through their acts of civil disobedience, Terrell believes that attorneys weaken the very
aspect of the law that gives them their unique power in the legal system.
130
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer, both
to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
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genre of “lawyer jokes” provides a fairly strong indication of this fact.
Consider just a small sampling:
Question: Why did the research scientist substitute lawyers for rats in his
laboratory experiments?
Answer: Lawyers breed more rapidly, scientists became less attached to
132
them, and there are some things that rats just won’t do.
Q[uestion]: What is the difference between a catfish and a lawyer?
A[nswer]: One is a disgusting, bottom-feeding scavenger, and the other
133
is just a fish.

More methodically gathered evidence confirms that the public has
a negative view of lawyers. In a recent public opinion poll, eighteen
percent of respondents believed that attorneys had high ethical standards. Lawyers were positioned near the bottom of professions in this
category, ranking above the likes of car salesmen and advertising prac134
titioners but below Congressmen. In another survey, only about one
in every four people said they trusted lawyers to tell the truth, posi135
tioning them nineteenth out of the twenty professions considered.
While negative social views of the legal profession are hardly
136
novel, the recent highly publicized corporate scandals have further
137
Lawyers played key roles in the
tarnished the image of attorneys.
138
Enron, Tyco, and Global Crossing affairs. As legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers has noted, whereas lawyers would ideally serve as “brakes
131

For a survey of this comedic craft, start with Lawyer Jokes, at
http://www.ahajokes.com/lawyer_jokes.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2004); Lawyer Jokes
and Cartoons, at http://www.lawyer-jokes.us (last visited Dec. 31, 2004); and http://
www.lawyerjokes101.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
132
Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
CAL. L. REV. 379, 379 (1987).
133
Smith, supra note 99, at 49.
134
Gallup Poll, Nov. 19-21, 2004, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/
values.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
135
The Harris Poll, Nov. 14-18, 2002, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/
workplay.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
136
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94-96 (2d ed.
1985) (noting that distrust and resentment of lawyers dates back to colonial times,
perpetuating ancient English prejudice); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF
KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2 (“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”).
137
See Smith, supra note 99, at 48 (“The image of lawyers reached new lows with
the wave of corporate scandals that shook Wall Street in 2002.”).
138
See id. at 48-49 (describing the involvement of lawyers in the Enron and Tyco
scandals); Koniak, supra note 77, at 58 (noting that Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s investigation of a whistle-blower memo about Global Crossing was “even worse than that
by Vinson & Elkins of the Sherron Watkins/Enron memo”).
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on bad conduct,” the reality is that “client pressures have turned [law139
yers] into more of a gas pedal.”
One might argue that the prevalence of such bleak views about attorneys lends support to the claim that lawyer civil disobedience
would be harmful to the profession. If the bar is on the brink of losing the public’s confidence altogether, the last thing we want is the
public to see attorneys flouting the authority of the law. This conclusion is flawed. It overlooks the reasons for the bar’s scarred image
and, consequently, misunderstands the effect of civil disobedience on
the profession.
Evidence suggests that the two ideas that most contribute to the
negative view of attorneys are the impression that they are moneyhungry and the belief that they “manipulate the legal system without
140
any concern for right or wrong.”
The common perception is that
today’s lawyer “all too often strives only to be ‘aggressive’ . . . not in
the pursuit of justice but only in the prurient, self-serving interests of
141
his or her own clients.” It is hard to imagine how publicity of a lawyer taking a deeply held moral stand, while willingly accepting the legal system’s punishment, would add to these negative images of the
profession. On the contrary, such actions display the characteristics
that the public seems to believe are lacking among lawyers: selfsacrifice, concern for the public interest, and recognition of the rule
of law.
It is significant that among our culture’s most revered images of
lawyers are those who protect justice over rigid and impersonal rules
and preserve moral integrity over personal interests. Atticus Finch,
perhaps the most dignified lawyer in our shared cultural memory,
agrees at the conclusion of To Kill a Mockingbird to lie to the town
about the circumstances of Bob Ewell’s death—that is, to obstruct jus-

139

Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58, 59 (quoting
Professor Gillers’s discussion of whether the SEC’s new regulations on lawyers go far
enough), available at http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/02_51/
b3813093.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
140
Post, supra note 132, at 380 (noting that 32% of respondents to a 1986 National
Law Journal poll thought that the most negative aspect of lawyers was their interest in
money, and 22% believed it was their exploitation of the legal system); see also
CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS: HOW LAWYERS, POLITICIANS, AND
BUREAUCRATS HAVE TURNED THE LAW INTO AN INSTRUMENT OF TYRANNY—AND WHAT
WE AS CITIZENS HAVE TO DO ABOUT IT 180-98 (2002) (describing how attorneys use
money to influence the legal and political system, in order for them to make more
money).
141
Smith, supra note 99, at 47-48.
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142

tice—in order to protect the innocent Boo Radley. John Grisham’s
143
lawyer-heroes often violate professional ethics to achieve justice. On
television’s The Practice, the attorneys repeatedly demonstrate what
William Simon calls “moral pluck,” which often requires them to ig144
nore their legal or ethical duties in the interest of what is right.
Such characters have in common an element of rebelliousness, generally revealed by their willingness to bend or break the strict edicts of
the law to arrive at the just result. If popularity is any indication, their
defiance of the law seems to have earned such attorneys our admira145
tion, not condemnation.
Of course, life is not a movie, and I do not argue based on fictional works that attorney civil disobedience would actually improve
the public’s respect for the legal profession. I merely claim that it is
highly unlikely that our society would condemn lawyers who commit
civil disobedience because they display precisely the virtues that the
public seems to want the bar to internalize. We must recognize that,
to some extent, the legal profession is in a no-win situation when it
comes to public respect. In an adversarial legal system, in which individuals rely on lawyers to protect their rights, attorneys are both loved
and reviled for the very same thing: strong advocacy of their client’s
146
We hate the fact that, in the words of Vito Corleone,
interests.
“[l]awyers can steal more money with a briefcase than a thousand men
147
with guns and masks,” but find it far less troubling when they are
“stealing” on our behalf. Attorney civil disobedience would not affect
this dynamic one way or another because it appeals to the best view of
lawyers as protectors of justice and virtue, especially when it comes

142

HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 274-79 (1960); see also Simon, supra note
45, at 421-22 (characterizing Atticus Finch’s actions as obstruction of justice, but noting that it is clear to the audience that Atticus has “do[ne] the right thing”).
143
See Simon, supra note 45, at 425-29 (discussing the prototypical role of ethics
violations in John Grisham’s novels).
144
See id. at 435-40 (describing the complicated role that morality plays in the television series).
145
See, e.g., CRIER, supra note 140 (dedicating her book to Henry Drummond,
from Inherit the Wind, and Atticus Finch, from To Kill a Mockingbird); Simon, supra note
45, at 437-38 (describing a scenario on The Practice in which an attorney flouts professional responsibility norms and noting that “most of us” probably sympathize with and
admire him for it).
146
See Post, supra note 132, at 380 (“[L]awyers are applauded for following their
clients’ wishes and bending the rules to satisfy those wishes; and they are at the very
same time condemned for . . . using the legal system to get what their clients want,
rather than to uphold the right and denounce the wrong.”).
147
MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 220 (1969).
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outside of the client context. Some official tolerance for lawyer noncompliance might not improve the public’s respect for the profession,
but it would not weaken it either.
C. Attorney Civil Disobedience and the Bar’s
Voluntary Promissory Obligation
The third argument against attorney civil disobedience is that
lawyers have voluntarily agreed to obey the law by choosing their
148
This contractarian
profession and agreeing to its ethical norms.
perspective of a lawyer’s duty to the law holds that, even though
other citizens have a right to commit civil disobedience, attorneys
have a heightened duty to obey the law by virtue of their conscious
149
When attorneys promise to uphold
decision to become lawyers.
and obey the law, they impose on themselves an additional moral
duty that is distinct from every citizen’s obligation to uphold the
rules of the state. In essence, this argument claims that attorneys
freely forsake the option of future civil disobedience the moment
they take their oaths for the bar.
The emphasis on the legal profession’s promissory obligation
to obey the law is inimical to the traditional concept of an independent bar capable of making free moral and political judg150
ments. The Supreme Court noted more than forty-five years ago
that a “bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to
151
obtain that goal.” The freedom to judge, criticize, and resist the
state’s authority is not taken from lawyers by their choice of profes152
sion.
148

See Wilkins, supra note 86, at 290 (“[U]nlike ordinary citizens, lawyers have expressly promised to obey the law. . . . By expressly undertaking this commitment, lawyers have entered into a voluntary agreement with society that, like any other promise,
has independent moral weight.”); see also McMorrow, supra note 38, at 142 (noting that
state bars “may compel a bar applicant to take an oath of office,” which likely includes
a promise to uphold the law).
149
See Terrell, supra note 28, at 846 (“Lawyers voluntarily join an association that
imposes duties on them.”).
150
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (“It is also important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated—free to think,
speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar.”).
151
Id.
152
See id. (noting that lawyers must remain “unintimidated,” with the freedom to
act on independent moral and political judgments); see also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622,
631 (1959) (“We start with the proposition that lawyers are free to criticize the state of
the law.”).
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There are compelling reasons to be wary of encroaching on the
bar’s independence. Attorneys are among the primary judicial actors
who interpret and implement the law. Their ability to make autonomous moral assessments of the law and publicly protest an immoral
rule is a critical check on injustice in our legal system. The acquiescence of the legal profession to the tragedies of Nazi Germany vividly
153
illustrates this point.
In the aftermath of World War II, scholars
considered how the German legal community had “easily succumbed
154
as a willing tool of the Nazis.” While no consensus emerged about
the cause for the lack of resistance, it was clear that the profession as a
whole had prioritized its legal duty to the state more highly than its
155
moral obligations, to an appalling end. This remains a powerful example of the dangerous potential that emerges by stripping the bar of
its ability and willingness to resist the state.
The concept of an independent bar presupposes that attorneys
do not forfeit all of their freedom to engage in conscientious dis156
obedience simply by joining the bar. Lawyers cannot possibly predict every moral problem they will encounter later in practice at the
157
time they take their oaths.
The concept of an independent legal
profession would be meaningless if it applied only at the moment
an attorney takes an oath, but was negated by that oath. The purpose of an independent bar is to provide ongoing vigilance against
153

See Simon, supra note 23, at 224 (discussing the dangers to a society when lawyers pledge “compliance with jurisdictionally adequate but morally evil laws like the
Nazi enactments requiring reporting Jews and dissidents”).
154
Strassberg, supra note 23, at 917.
155
See id. at 917-18 (describing the debates among scholars over the role of legal
positivism in Nazi Germany).
156
See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 202 n.56 (arguing that attorneys do not forsake
their right to conscientiously disobey the law when they join the bar).
157
Id. There is an argument to be made, based on contract law, that a lawyer may
be released from her oath to obey the law in cases where the state of the law frustrates
the lawyer’s principal purpose of working for justice. See Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740, 748
(Eng. C.A. 1903) (releasing defendant from his obligations under a contract which
had its basic purpose frustrated prior to performance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 (1979) (stating the principle of discharge by supervening frustration); supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (outlining the obligation in the ethics
rules to make the law more just). It is unclear, however, that this argument would have
much traction in light of the competing principle of assignment of risk in long-term
contracts for foreseeable events. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,
799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that the frustration of purpose defense is
improper where the parties have assigned the burden of risk in a contract); Lloyd v.
Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (holding that the risk of a frustrating event that is
reasonably foreseeable is assumed and cannot be grounds for a frustration of purpose
defense).
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future injustice. Lawyers must make moral judgments about the law
as it changes, not as it was when they agreed to uphold it in their
oath.
Professor Freedman notes that an attorney remains “a free person,
with moral responsibility,” despite taking the oath for admission to the
158
bar. Attorneys unavoidably assume a measure of moral responsibility for the substantive outcomes of the law because they “exercise
quasi-legislative power in deciding whether a given legal command
159
Given this responsibility, it is reasonapplies to a particular case.”
able to expect that the concept of attorney independence would also
give attorneys some autonomy over the decision to resist an unjust
160
law. Civil disobedience is an accepted form of protest by other citizens and a critical tool for attorneys to prevent injustice that is not
161
removed by an oath. The voluntary decision to join the bar cannot
alone strip lawyers of this freedom.
D. Attorney Civil Disobedience and the Bar’s
Privileged Position
The final argument against attorney civil disobedience is based
on the fact that lawyers enjoy far more power within the legal system
than other citizens. Some critics of lawyer noncompliance claim
that the additional opportunities attorneys have to initiate reform
162
lawfully make their civil disobedience unjustified.
Actions that
might be defensible if taken by a nonlawyer are inappropriate for
163
lawyers, who have far greater legal options at their disposal.
Other commentators argue that the power attorneys have within the
158

Freedman, supra note 2, at 1138; cf. THOREAU, supra note 18, at 243 (arguing
that even a just government authorized by “the sanction and consent of the governed”
had “no pure right over [his] person”).
159
Wilkins, supra note 100, at 514.
160
See id. (arguing that lawyers must have the “right to reject the formal requirements of rules and roles in situations when following the official path would produce
substantively bad results”).
161
See supra notes 2, 27 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that
civil disobedience is an accepted form of protest).
162
See Cowen, supra note 2, at 597 (arguing that attorney civil disobedience is
rarely justified since lawyers have “a greater opportunity than does the layman to rectify allegedly unjust or immoral laws within the existing legal structure”).
163
This argument presupposes that the validity of civil disobedience depends, in
part, on the unavailability of other forms of protest. Others contend that such an assumption is unnecessarily restrictive on civil disobedience. See, e.g., Luban, supra note
22, at 801 (stating that one’s duty to obey the law turns solely on whether the laws are
worthy of respect).
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legal system comes with the legitimate expectation that attorneys
164
Attorneys alone may pull the levers of legal rewill exercise it.
165
form, established as a form of democratic protection of citizens.
Thus, when lawyers choose to break the law in protest instead of
utilizing the legal options available, they betray their role in our
166
democracy.
There are two responses to this objection. First, a lawyer’s power
comes hand-in-hand with insight into the legal system that other citizens lack. In addition to giving attorneys a privileged position, a lawyer’s professional role provides her with unique opportunities to see
the law operate wrongly or unfairly. Attorneys have a better sense of
which laws create the greatest injustices and which may actually be
improved through noncompliance. Moreover, an attorney’s role differs from that of nonlawyers in that they are charged as guardians of
167
the administration of justice.
These differences between members
of the legal profession and other citizens may actually make “a lawyer . . . particularly well equipped to break or disregard the law as an
168
act of civil disobedience.”
In addition, it is possible to exaggerate the power attorneys have
within the legal system. We have already seen the ways in which this
169
Even for attorneys, lawful reform of unjust laws
power is limited.

164

See Wilkins, supra note 86, at 274 (“Lawyers are more than ordinary citizens;
they have been given a monopoly by the state to occupy a position of trust both with
respect to the interests of their clients and the public purposes of the legal framework.”).
165
See id. (describing the role of lawyers as monopolistic and noting that this role
is tied to the social good).
166
Not everyone agrees that lawyers should be regarded as playing a unique role
within our society. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1080 (1976) (“Some of the more ecstatic critics
have put forward the lawyer as some kind of anointed priest of justice . . . . But this is
wrong. In a democratic society, . . . . [e]very citizen has the same duty to work for . . . the
establishment of just institutions, and the lawyer has no special moral responsibilities
in that regard.” (footnote omitted)).
167
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (noting the duty imposed on lawyers to improve the law).
168
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Private Lives and Professional Responsibilities? The Relationship of Personal Morality to Lawyering and Professional Ethics, 21 PACE L. REV. 365, 388
(2001); see also Luban, supra note 28, at 259 (“[B]ecause lawyers are often better positioned than nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law, lawyers
often should be among the first to violate or nullify it, or to counsel others that it is
acceptable to violate or nullify it.”).
169
See text accompanying notes 55-58 (describing the limits on lawful reform by
lawyers).
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170

may be either impossible or strictly limited.
A lawyer may be the
only individual who can protest the law, and civil disobedience may be
the only way to lodge such protests. Thus, the power of attorneys
alone should not prevent us from explicitly tolerating their civil disobedience.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR OFFICIAL TREATMENT OF
ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The current rules of legal ethics overdeter attorney civil disobedience due to the simple fact that they do not address it directly. Attorneys are left with little guidance from the organized bar about which
principles, if any, constitute a moral justification for violating the law.
Moreover, the ethics rules are of little help in determining the profes171
sional consequences of disobedience.
With so much uncertainty
about civil disobedience in the law governing lawyers, committing it
remains a high stakes gamble. As demonstrated in Part III, the justifications for excluding a more forthright discussion of conscientious
noncompliance in the Model Code and Model Rules are weak. Recognizing the option of attorney civil disobedience will not threaten the
public’s respect for the law, the legal system, or the legal profession.
Even the critics of attorney civil disobedience agree that there are
some instances in which it is unreasonable to impose on lawyers a
categorical duty to obey the law. The case of Nazi Germany presents a
moral baseline at which these commentators concur that noncompli172
ance is justified. The more complicated issue is how to define a lawyer’s duty to obey the law in legal regimes, such as ours, that are “gen173
erally just.” In this section, I will propose amendments to the Model
Rules to better identify and accommodate instances of justified civil
disobedience in the context of the American legal system.

170

See Minow, supra note 37, at 727-39 (describing the limits on lawful reform, the
potential negative consequences in pursuing it, and the advantages that civil disobedience offers in certain situations).
171
See supra Part II (discussing the uncertain treatment in the legal ethics rules
and case law of attorney civil disobedience).
172
See Terrell, supra note 28, at 833-34 (acknowledging that lawyers in a thoroughly
unjust system may justifiably disobey the law); Wilkins, supra note 86, at 285 (“[N]ot
even the most ardent defenders of the Dominant View of legal ethics, or of Positivism
more generally, believe that either lawyers or citizens are under an absolute moral obligation to obey the law no matter how evil or corrupt.”).
173
See Wilkins, supra note 86, at 285 (noting that the important question is how to
define the bar’s prima facie obligation to obey the law).
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A. Defining Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience should be incorporated into the Model Rules
as a defense to mitigate the effects of the charge that an attorney has
174
violated her legal duties.
To recognize such a defense in the
codes, we must define what constitutes civil disobedience. This task
174

The difficulty of identifying attorney civil disobedience in some cases is illustrated by the recent development of multidisciplinary practices (MDPs). The most
prominent types of MDPs are those which offer business consulting, financial planning, and legal services to their clients all at once by “partnering . . . lawyers and nonlawyers in multi-task service firms.” Jeffrey M. Jones, Comment, Bend, but Don’t Break:
MDP Proposal Bends in the Right Direction, but—Crack!!—Goes Too Far, 54 SMU L. REV.
395, 395 (2001). While they provide the advantages of “one-stop shopping” to clients,
lawyers working in MDPs routinely breach ethics rules about fee sharing, conflicts of
interest, and client confidentiality. See id. (“But despite the business efficiencies of
MDPs, such a combination of services is wrought with ethical difficulty.”); see also Linda
Galler, Problems in Defining and Controlling the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 773, 774 (2002) (citing an ABA resolution that rejected MDPs by spelling out the
core values that MDPs would ostensibly violate).
Some observers have argued that MDPs are “blatantly violating” the rules of legal
ethics and that their lawyers are engaged in massive civil disobedience, essentially daring bar disciplinary boards to try to stop them. See Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the
Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations
on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1097, 1105 (2000) [hereinafter Accountants
Are Hawks] (describing the hiring of thousands of lawyers by the Big 5 accounting
firms as civil disobedience); Lawrence J. Fox, Those Who Worry About the Ethics of Negotiation Should Never Be Viewed as Just Another Set of Service Providers, 52 MERCER L. REV. 977,
988 (2001) (arguing that accountants have tried to justify “the civil disobedience of the
thousands of lawyers they have hired”); see also Galler, supra, at 774 (proposing solutions to address the civil disobedience of the accounting firm MDPs and their lawyers).
Other observers believe that, whatever the transgressions of MDPs, characterizing
their growth as civil disobedience goes well overboard. See, e.g., Erica Blaschke Zolner,
Comment, Jack of All Trades: Integrated Multidisciplinary Practice, or Formal Referral System?
Emerging Global Trends in the Legal and Accounting Professions and the Need for Accommodation of the MDP, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 235, 252-53 (2001) (criticizing the claim that
lawyers at MDPs are engaging in civil disobedience as a “doomsday prediction” that
inaccurately depicts a crisis in the legal profession). The MDPs themselves, as they interpret the rules of ethics, argue that they have not violated them, conscientiously or
otherwise. See Fox, Accountants Are Hawks, supra, at 1100 (reciting the MDP argument
that their lawyers are not subject to the rules of professional ethics because they are
not practicing law).
No one—especially not the bar—seems to know quite how to handle the MDPs.
Their practices represent a significant and intentional departure from current professional norms, but enforcement of the ethics provisions supposedly violated by MDPs
has remained lax, and MDPs vigorously fought the few enforcement proceedings
brought against them. See Jones, supra, at 425-26 (remarking that there is “very little in
the way of enforcement [of the disciplinary rules] to show” for all the concern about
MDPs, and reporting that an enforcement action against an MDP failed because the
MDP “simply overwhelmed the bar with a phalanx of defense lawyers” (quoting Krysten Crawford, The Enemy Has Landed, and They Count Beans, AM. LAW., Dec. 1998, at
16)).
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is more difficult than it would first seem. There is a wide range of
attorney behavior that falls within the “gray areas” of positive law,
with the result being that there are times when it may be difficult to
pin down which actions constitute actual noncompliance. This is
especially true when the alleged wrongdoer refuses to acknowledge
her offense.
A definition of civil disobedience in the ethics rules should include four elements. First, the act constituting civil disobedience
must be public. An attorney’s actions should only fall within the definition if she acknowledges that she has broken the law and offers civil
disobedience as a defense. Though there may be instances in which
nonpublic lawbreaking is more effective for ensuring a just result,
such behavior does not demonstrate the respect for the law that redeems an attorney’s defiance and gives the system an opportunity to
175
respond. Moreover, if a nonpublic violation were to become public,
it would undermine trust in the legal profession much more than if it
176
had been public from the beginning.
Second, the disobedience must be nonviolent. A civil disobedience defense cannot be a safe harbor for violence. Noncompliance
177
with unjust laws loses its legitimacy when it is violent.
Third, the attorney must offer an explanation of her defiance
178
based on moral or religious conviction.
David Luban has persuasively argued that the obligation to obey the law can be understood,
179
When attorneys
in part, as an obligation to our fellow citizens.
(and other citizens) seek to convince the legal system that violating
this obligation was justified, they owe their fellow citizens an explana180
tion of why they believed the law was “wrong, stupid, or unfair.”
Though identifying when an attorney’s moral or religious beliefs actually compel her to violate the law is a delicate matter, the jurisprudence regarding conscientious objectors to military service provides a
helpful comparison. Citizens have been relieved from their military
duty on grounds of ethical standards that had a “functional role in
175

See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 214-16 (discussing the problems caused by secret conscientious objection by attorneys).
176
See id. at 215-16 (“[S]ecret conscientious objection may contribute to the public’s general image of ineffective or disloyal lawyering . . . .”).
177
Cf. King, supra note 10 (describing the legitimacy of nonviolent direct action).
178
See Griffin, supra note 50, at 1259-61 (arguing that the civil disobedience model
is appropriate for lawyers who break the law for religious reasons).
179
See LUBAN, supra note 37, at 35-43 (explaining the proposition that respect for
the law is “respect for our fellows”).
180
Id. at 47.
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guiding the objector’s behavior throughout his everyday activities,”
when these beliefs were held extremely deeply, and when the objector demonstrated his strength of convictions by accepting punish181
ment. These standards provide the bar with a touchstone by which
to judge whether an attorney’s asserted moral commitments are
genuine.
Finally, civil disobedience should exclude activities motivated
182
primarily by material self-interest. An attorney who cannot establish
this element is unlikely to succeed in establishing the previous one either. Explicitly stating this requirement, however, emphasizes—to the
legal profession and to the public—the features of self-sacrifice and
concern for the public interest that are central to civil disobedience.
B. Limiting Disciplinary Discretion
Commentators disagree on how much discretion should be afforded to disciplinary bodies in punishing attorneys who engage in
civil disobedience. Generally, those scholars who wish to restrict discretion in punishing defiant attorneys are those who are also skeptical
183
of the propriety of attorney civil disobedience.
I believe, however,
that a call for constrained discretion in the bar’s disciplinary system is
an important element of making the legal profession more tolerant of
lawyer noncompliance.
There are two ways in which disciplinary discretion should be limited. First, I propose to limit the range of professional consequences
that attorneys currently face for civil disobedience. The ethics rules
currently provide no hint of the consequences of conscientious noncompliance. Rather, attorneys are left to gamble on the response of
the bar’s disciplinary authorities, with little help in determining
whether their disobedience will be ignored, result in a slap on the
184
wrist, or cost them their licenses. Without a clear picture of the risk
to their careers, attorneys cannot make an informed evaluation of
whether they should conscientiously violate a law. Establishing a more
181

See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 202-05 (discussing legal standards for granting
conscientious objector status).
182
Cf. Luban, supra note 28, at 259 n.34 (suggesting that civil disobedience should
exclude actions taken by a lawyer for “intended pecuniary gain”).
183
See, e.g., Terrell, supra note 28, at 831-34 (opposing increased discretion in interpreting the rules and criticizing attorney civil disobedience in a “generally just” legal
system).
184
See supra text accompanying note 77 (describing the uncertainty about the bar’s
response to civil disobedience).
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limited range of punishment within the ethics rules for disciplining
civil disobedience will allow lawyers to consider noncompliance more
thoughtfully. Because of a lawyer’s heightened duty to obey the law,
some professional disciplinary consequences are appropriate for at185
But at the same time, the
torneys who commit civil disobedience.
professional penalty to attorneys cannot be so great that their very
186
ability to practice law may be at stake, as it currently is.
Attorneys
should be subject, at the very worst, to no more than a temporary suspension of their ability to practice.
I also propose to limit the ability of disciplinary counsel to turn a
187
blind eye to attorney civil disobedience. As Professor Bruce Green
has observed, the attitude of disciplinary counsel towards conscientious lawbreaking is often that lawyers should go ahead and do it, but
188
“[j]ust don’t tell us about it.” This form of prosecutorial discretion
undermines the justifications for and effectiveness of attorney civil
disobedience in several ways. First, the exercise of such discretion
strips civil disobedience of its value as a tool for improving the law. By
giving a defiant attorney a pass, the bar minimizes the law-morality
conflict that the lawyer’s disobedience highlights. This robs both the
bar and the legal system of an opportunity to publicly evaluate the attorney’s criticism and to adequately consider the most appropriate response. Second, attorneys who have committed civil disobedience
show their respect for the law by accepting punishment. If lawyers
face no disciplinary proceedings for their violations, this element of
respect is not displayed to the public. This potentially undermines the
189
Finally,
public’s respect for the law and for the legal profession.
prosecutorial discretion detracts from the generality of the ethics rules
190
and weakens their moral authority. This is contrary to the purpose
of civil disobedience, which is to strengthen legal authority, not to
undermine it.

185

See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing a lawyer’s increased
responsibility to obey the law).
186
See Terrell, supra note 28, at 835-36 (noting that disbarment is a potential consequence of civil disobedience).
187
Compare id. at 840 (arguing against increasing discretion within legal ethics to
accommodate civil disobedience), with Strassberg, supra note 23, at 951-52 (supporting
increased prosecutorial discretion for justified noncompliance).
188
Green, supra note 77, at 1308 (quoting an unidentified disciplinary counsel).
189
See supra Part III.A-B (discussing how attorneys show respect for the law by accepting punishment willingly).
190
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that the fairness and generality of the law is the feature that earns it our respect).
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CONCLUSION
Though lawyers must often resolve conflicts between their legal
duties and their moral obligations, the Model Rules and Model Code
provide little guidance to attorneys for resolving these struggles. The
ethics rules are unhelpful in determining if or when moral principles
outweigh a lawyer’s obligation to obey the law, leaving attorneys who
wish to engage in civil disobedience to gamble their careers on the
discretion of the bar’s disciplinary authorities. Moreover, the arguments offered for continuing to ignore conscientious noncompliance
in the codes of ethics are unpersuasive.
The legal profession should directly address the issue of civil disobedience in its rules of ethics. The bar will be strengthened by the
explicit acknowledgement that moral considerations can supercede
even an attorney’s legal duties. Our society expects lawyers, who remain its most important custodians of the law’s fairness and justice, to
exercise moral judgment for the good of our legal system. As Gandhi’s example teaches us, an attorney need not sacrifice her respect
for the law or undermine her role in the legal system by committing
civil disobedience. It is past time for the bar to recognize the possibility that an attorney may best fulfill her duties to the law and to our society through conscientious noncompliance.

